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THE IMPACT OF THE MEDICARE MODERNIZATION ACT’S 
CONTRACTOR REFORM ON FEE-FOR-SERVICE MEDICARE 
SUSAN BARTLETT FOOTE* 
The contentious and partisan debate surrounding the Medicare 
Modernization Act (MMA)1 and the subsequent political, media, and public 
discussion focused on the high profile provisions relating to prescription 
drug coverage and the new Medicare Advantage plans.2  However, the 
legislation also contained little-noticed and relatively non-controversial 
provisions to reform the role of Medicare contractors.3  These reforms and 
their subsequent implementation by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) affect fee-for-service (FFS), or “traditional,” Medicare 
through which a majority of Medicare beneficiaries receive their medical 
services.4 
This article (1) discusses the roots of the original Medicare contractor 
structure and traces its evolution from 1965 until the passage of the MMA; 
(2) examines the MMA contractor reform legislation and its implementation 
to date; and (3) analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the reform and its 
implications for the future of FFS Medicare. 
 
* J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; M.A., American & Latin 
American History, Case Western Reserve University; Professor, Division of Health Policy and 
Management, University of Minnesota School of Public Health. 
 1. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 26 U.S.C.). 
 2. See, e.g., Robert Pear & Robin Toner, Partisan Arguing and Fine Print Seen as 
Hindering Medicare Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, at A1, available at www.nytimes.com/ 
2004/10/11/politics/11medicare.html?ex=1255233600&en=87d60bcfe109b4b3&ei=508
8&partner=rssnyt (last visited Oct. 27, 2007). 
 3. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act §§ 911-912, 117 
Stat. at 2378-88. 
 4. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: MEDICARE ADVANTAGE (Sept. 
2005), available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/Medicare-Advantage-April-2005-Fact-
Sheet.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2007) (noting that 88% of Medicare beneficiaries have their 
health bills paid by the traditional FFS program); cf. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, 
REPORT TO CONGRESS: ISSUES IN A MODERNIZED MEDICARE PROGRAM 60 (2005) (discussing 
membership trends in Medicare private plans declining from 17% in 1999 to 12% in 2004). 
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I.  BACKGROUND: THE ROLE OF CONTRACTORS FROM 1965-2003 
The political debates leading up to the passage of the Medicare Act in 
1965 were bitter and protracted.5  A major barrier to passing the legislation 
was the hospitals and organized medicine’s opposition to perceived 
governmental interference with their unfettered freedom to practice 
medicine.6  In order to secure these key constituencies’ support, Congress 
designed the Medicare program to allow private insurers to contract with the 
government.7  These contractors would process providers’ claims for 
payment, essentially serving as a “‘buffer between the hospital and the 
federal government.’”8 
The 1965 Medicare statute defined two different contracting structures 
to correspond to the separation of Part A (hospital services) and Part B 
(physician services).  Section 1816 of the Social Security Act authorized the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare9 to establish agreements with 
fiscal intermediaries (FIs) nominated by individual hospitals to make 
Medicare payments to these providers.10  Section 1842 authorized the 
Secretary to enter into contracts with health insurers (referred to as carriers) 
to make Medicare payments to physicians, practitioners, and other 
healthcare entities.11  The Part B contracts were organized by geographic 
regions; one carrier had exclusive jurisdiction within the contract’s region, 
thus all Part B claims in that region were submitted to that carrier.12 
The statute specifically set out certain terms and conditions of the 
contracting agreements for FIs and carriers, including how the contracts 
were to be awarded and terminated, cost-based reimbursement provisions 
for contractor services, the required claims processing and related activities, 
 
 5. See generally JUDITH M. FEDER, MEDICARE: THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL HOSPITAL 
INSURANCE (1977) (discussing the influence politics and the political administration had on 
making the Social Security Administration responsible for Medicare); THEODORE R. MARMOR, 
THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE (1973) (discussing the various players and kinds of legislative 
activity involved in Congress enacting controversial legislation such as Medicare); PAUL STARR, 
THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982). 
 6. See FEDER, supra note 5, at 37-38. 
 7. See id. at 37. 
 8. Id. (quoting a former Social Security Administration official’s explanation of the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary’s testimony before the Senate 
Finance Committee in 1965). 
 9. In 1980, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare became the Department 
of Health and Human Services.  See History of HHS, www.hhs.gov/faq/about/department/ 
1894.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2007). 
 10. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, sec. 102, § 1816, 79 
Stat. 286, 297 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395h). 
 11. See id. sec. 102, § 1842, 79 Stat. at 309-10. 
 12. See ROBERT J. MYERS, MEDICARE 181-82 (1970). 
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as well as performance standards for contractors.13  The statutory specificity 
reflected the need to reassure the providers how the government planned to 
use private insurers to manage the interface with hospitals and doctors.14 
A. Implementation and Evolution of Contractors 
After the Medicare Act was passed, the program’s administrators 
implemented the new contracting process for FIs and carriers.15  The 
American Hospital Association, then affiliated with Blue Cross, selected the 
national Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association (BCBSA) as the prime 
contractor for all member hospitals.  BCBSA, in turn, subcontracted with 
local Blues plans to perform the services.16  Most hospitals selected Blue 
Cross as their FI; however, a few hospitals selected one of the five other 
national insurance companies or an independent hospital association as 
their FI.17  Others chose to deal directly with the Social Security 
Administration.18 
To implement the Part B contracting plan, the administration divided the 
country into sixty-four regions.19  Only 49 of the 140 organizations, 
including Blue Shield plans and commercial insurers, that submitted 
proposals to be carriers received contracts.20  Many of the geographic 
regions for a single carrier contract were whole states.  However, some 
large states or states where there were multiple applicants were carved into 
several jurisdictions.21 
Although the statute contained some specific provisions that remained 
constant from 1965 to 2000, the Medicare program evolved over time 
within the original statutory framework.  In the 1960s, the contractor 
structure depended on the existing private insurance system.22  As private 
insurers changed, so did Medicare contractors.  The number of contractors 
 
 13. See  sec. 102, § 1842, 79 Stat. at 309-10. 
 14. See MYERS, supra note 12, at 179-80 (discussing how “fiscal intermediaries” was 
narrowly defined regarding power and responsibility). 
 15. See Susan Bartlett Foote, Focus on Locus: Evolution of Medicare’s Local Coverage 
Policy, 22 HEALTH AFF. 137, 137-145 (2003) (discussing the legislative history and 
administrative implementation of Medicare’s local coverage policy). 
 16. ROBERT CUNNINGHAM III & ROBERT M. CUNNINGHAM JR., THE BLUES: A HISTORY OF THE 
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD SYSTEM 147 (1997). 
 17. See MYERS, supra note 12, at 179. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 181. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See id. at 181-182 (discussing the regional design of the carriers). 
 22. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE CONTRACTORS: DESPITE ITS EFFORTS, HCFA 
CANNOT ENSURE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS OR INTEGRITY 43 (1999), available at www.gao.gov/ 
archive/1999/he99115.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2007). 
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has been reduced considerably over time.  The General Accounting Office23 
(GAO) reported that there were 75 FIs and 43 carriers in 1980.  The 
numbers dropped to 36 FIs and 22 carriers in 1999 and then to 25 FIs and 
18 carriers in 2005.24  These changes largely reflect consolidations in the 
private insurance industry, especially among local and regional Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield plans.25  In addition, some plans left the business to 
concentrate on their “core insurance market functions,” while others were 
accused of fraud and abuse, faced criminal and civil settlements, and 
withdrew from the program.26  Successful contractors took advantage of 
departures to acquire additional carrier and FI contracts to build multi-
contract networks.27  The growth of multi-state networks led to significant 
variations in the size, sophistication, resources, and productivity of 
contracting services.28 
Over time the responsibilities of the remaining contractors expanded as 
did the regulatory framework in which contractors operated. Originally, 
contractors focused on processing claims for payment, serving essentially as 
a bill paying service.29  However, as the Medicare program grew and 
became more complex, the contractors took on greater responsibilities for 
medical provider education, local coverage policy development, and other 
public communication.30 
The original statutory provisions surrendered major management control 
of the Medicare program to the contractors.31  However, as costs exploded 
and complexities grew, the administration exercised greater control over 
contractors, as evidenced by increasing procedural requirements and 
 
 23. In 2004, the General Accounting Office’s name changed to the Government 
Accountability Office. U.S. GAO, GAO's Name Change and Other Provisions of the GAO 
Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, http://gao.gov/about/namechange.html (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2007). 
 24. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,  supra note 22, at 45 fig.3.1; MICHAEL O. LEAVITT, 
REPORT TO CONGRESS – MEDICARE CONTRACTING REFORM: A BLUEPRINT FOR A BETTER MEDICARE 
I-2 (2005), available at www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareContractingReform/Downloads/report_ 
to_congress.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2007). 
 25. See Foote, supra note 15, at 140. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. at 141. 
 28. See generally Susan Bartlett Foote et al., Resolving the Tug-of-War Between 
Medicare’s National and Local Coverage, 23 HEALTH AFF. 108 (2004) (discussing the 
evolution of multi-state networks and analyzing variation among Medicare contractors). 
 29. See Susan Bartlett Foote & Gwen Wagstrom Halaas, Defining a Future for Fee-for-
Service Medicare, 25 HEALTH AFF. 864, 865 (2006). 
 30. See id. at 865 (discussing current responsibilities of local contractors). 
 31. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, sec. 102, §§ 1816, 
1842, 79 Stat. 286, 297, 309-10 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395h, 1395u). 
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performance oversight.32  GAO reports strongly criticized the contractors’ 
performance.33  Continual tension between federal regulators and the 
contractors existed over management and oversight responsibilities.34 
B. Early Efforts for Contractor Reform 
For over twenty-five years, periodic efforts have been made to amend 
the statutory contracting rules.  As early as 1980, the deputy administrator 
of the Health Care Financing Administration testified that the program 
“‘do[es] not contain sufficient incentives for efficient, innovative . . . 
operations.’”35  Since 1993, proposals have been made to amend the 
legislation to increase competition for contracts and to provide more 
flexibility in the contract relationships.36  During the 107th Congress, the 
Health Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee again 
focused on the issue.  In a rare demonstration of bi-partisanship, 
Subcommittee Chairman Nancy Johnson (R-CT) and Ranking Member 
Fortney (Pete) Stark (D-CA) introduced the “Medicare Regulatory 
 
 32. The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), the agency preceding CMS, 
issued manuals for the FIs and carriers that contain regulations, guidance documents, and 
other directives that the contractors must follow.  CMS frequently revises the Manuals to reflect 
changing administrative policies and procedures.  See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., CMS MANUAL SYSTEM PUB 100-104: MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING (May 2, 2005) 
(discussing changes made to Medicare Claims Processing Manual regarding FI claim 
adjudication), available at www3.cms.hhs.gov/Transmittals/downloads/R555CP.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2007). 
 33. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 22, at 20-42 (explaining 
how weak oversight of contractors makes Medicare vulnerable since several contractors have 
misrepresented their performance to HCFA and been involved in qui tam actions and other 
Department of Justice investigations). 
 34. See STARR, supra note 5, at 379-80 (explaining that until the 1970s, the health system 
had the authority to run its own affairs; however, during the 1970s as costs rose, tensions 
grew between the medical care system’s  expansion and a state and society that were  
requiring control over medical expenditures and the health system). 
 35. Patients First– A 21st Century Promise to Ensure Quality and Affordable Health 
Coverage: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Subcomm. on Oversight & 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 4 (2001) [hereinafter 
Joint Hearing] (statement of Thomas A. Scully, Administrator, Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/107/action/ 
107-52.pdf  (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (quoting a 1980 statement by former Deputy 
Administrator of HCFA, Earl Collier). 
 36. See The Medicare Regulatory and Contracting Reform Act of 2001: Hearing on H.R. 
2768 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. On Ways & Means, 107th Cong. 43 
(2001) (statement of Leslie G. Aronovitz, Director, Healthcare Program, Administration and 
Integrity Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo. 
gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_house_hearings&docid=f:76025.pdf (last visited Nov. 
10, 2007). 
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Contracting Reform Act of 2001” (H.R. 2768) on August 2, 2001.37  The 
Ways and Means Committee favorably reported the bill on October 4, 
2001.38  After review by the Energy and Commerce Committee, a revised 
version of the bill (H.R. 3391) passed the House on a 408-0 vote on 
December 4, 2001.39 
Similar to prior reform efforts, the key purpose of the House bill was to 
provide Medicare with management tools to operate more efficiently.40  
These tools included competitive contracting rules, consolidating Part A and 
Part B contractors, and allowing contracts for specific services such as 
claims processing or education.41  The Bush administration strongly 
supported these efforts.42  During the debate in 2001, then CMS 
Administrator Tom Scully specifically criticized the large number of 
contractors and the inconsistencies in the way they processed claims.43  He 
stated that the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), Tommy 
Thompson, specifically directed him to “fix” the contractor system.44  The 
Senate took no action on the issue, and the bill died.45  However, the 
Medicare Modernization and Prescription Drug Act that passed the House in 
2002 incorporated most of the House bill’s provisions.46 
II.  THE MMA INCORPORATES CONTRACTOR REFORM 
A. The MMA Provisions 
During the 108th Congress, Chairman Johnson and Representative 
Stark reintroduced Medicare contractor reform in a freestanding bill.47  
Entitled the “Medicare Regulatory and Contracting Reform Act of 2003,” 
H.R. 810 was nearly identical to H.R. 3391 that had passed in the House in 
 
 37. H.R. REP. NO. 108-74, pt. 1, at 39 (2003). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-288, pt. 1, at 22 (2001) (noting that a purpose of H.R. 2768 
was to streamline the regulatory process). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 22-23. 
 43. See Foote, supra note 15, at 143. 
 44. See Joint Hearing, supra note 35 (explaining that  Secretary Thompson continually 
asked Administrator Scully to “fix” the way the Medicare contracting system works). 
 45.  See U.S. House Comm. on Ways & Means, Status of Bills & Resolutions Within the 
Jurisdiction of the Comm. on Ways & Means on Which Legislative Action Was Taken, 107th 
Congress, at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/graphics/status107.htm (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2007) (showing Senate took no action on H.R. 3391). 
 46. H.R. REP. NO. 108-74, pt. 1, at 39-40 (2003). 
 47. H.R. REP. NO. 108-74, pt. 1, at 40 (2003). 
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the previous session.48  The Senate was much less involved with the 
contractor reform part of the MMA.49  Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) 
introduced S. 133250 as a companion bill to H.R. 810, but the Senate took 
no action.  However, the final version of the MMA did incorporate the 
contractor reform language developed in the House bill.51 
The contractor reform provisions aim to improve what legislators termed 
“an antiquated, inefficient, and closed system” that “has failed to keep pace 
with integrated delivery in the private sector.”52  Section 1874A directs the 
Secretary to merge the Part A FIs and Part B carriers into new Medicare 
Administrative Contractors (MACs).53  The legislation also permits greater 
contracting flexibility by allowing a wider range of entities to participate in 
the program and allowing separate “functional” contracts.54  The Secretary 
is given the authority to take performance quality, price, and other factors 
into account in a competitive bidding process to award MAC contracts and 
can renew these contracts for up to five years.55  The legislation requires the 
Secretary to provide reports detailing the agency’s plan for implementing 
these provisions.56 
B. Implementation Begins: The Leavitt Report 
In February of 2005, HHS Secretary Michael Leavitt gave Congress the 
department’s required report recounting the progress in implementing the 
contracting provisions.57  Secretary Leavitt’s report recites Congress’ reform 
objectives and notes that the main goal of contractor reform is to streamline 
 
 48. Id. at 39. 
 49. See U.S. House Comm. on Ways & Means, Status of Bills and Resolutions Within the 
Jurisdiction of the Comm. on Ways & Means On Which Legislative Action Was Taken, 108th 
Congress, at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/graphics/status108.htm (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2007) (showing Senate took no action on H.R. 810). 
 50. Medicare Education, Regulatory Reform, and Contracting Improvement Act of 2003, 
S. 1332, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 51. Compare Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 108-173 §§ 911-912, 117 Stat. 2066, 2378-88 with H.R. 810, 108th Cong. 
(2003). 
 52. H.R. REP. NO. 107-288, pt. 1, at 23 (2001). 
 53. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, sec. 911(a)(1), § 1874A, 117 Stat. 2066, 2378 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
1395kk-1). 
 54. See id. at sec. 911(a)(1), § 1874A(a) (giving the Secretary authority to contract with 
“any eligible entity” and  allowing an entity to enter into a contract to perform a particular 
function). 
 55. Id. at sec. 911(a)(1), § 1874A, 117 Stat. 2066, 2379-81. 
 56. Id. at sec. 911(a)(1), § 1874A, 117 Stat. 2066, 2386. 
 57. LEAVITT, supra note 24. 
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Medicare’s FFS operations.58  HHS began with reducing the number of 
contractors by merging Part A and Part B contractors.59  Accordingly, HHS 
also reduced the number of regions by redrawing the lines to correspond to 
the new MACs.60  HHS planned to “award 15 Primary A/B MACs servicing 
the majority of all types of providers, 4 specialty MACs servicing . . . home 
health and hospice (HH) providers, and 4 specialty MACs servicing durable 
medical equipment (DME) suppliers.”61  Although some variation exists 
among the fifteen regions, they were carved out to balance the number of 
FFS beneficiaries and Medicare providers in each region and create a more 
equalized distribution of workload than was present under the FI and carrier 
assignment system.62  The goals for the new MAC contractors in these 
regions are to integrate claims processing activities, improve customer 
service and operations, reduce claims processing error rates, and implement 
new information technology to modernize and update antiquated financial 
management and fragmented accounting systems.63 
Secretary Leavitt’s report describes the new MAC selection schedule.  
Between 2005 and 2009, CMS will choose the MACs from the pool of 
competing contractors.64  The first new A/B MAC and four DME MACs were 
awarded in 2006,65 and the full FFS workload transition will be completed 
by October 2009.66 
III.  ANALYSIS 
CMS administrators and their predecessors sought the contractor reform 
provisions in the MMA for many years.67  Should these provisions be 
considered a victory for FFS Medicare?  Will these modifications to the 
original contractor legislation ensure that Medicare FFS is, as Secretary 
 
 58. See id. at i. 
 59. See id. at III-2. 
 60. Id. at III-2, III-3. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See LEAVITT, supra note 24, at III-3. 
 63. See id. at Chapter III. 
 64. See id. at III-3.  The process of replacing old contracts is still underway as of this 
writing. 
 65. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTOR (MAC) 
JURISDICTIONS FACT SHEET 4 (Sept. 2007), available at www.cms.hhs.gov/Medicare 
ContractingReform/Downloads/MAC_Jurisdiction_Facts.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2007). 
 66. LEAVITT, supra note 24, at III-3. 
 67. See Joint Hearing, supra note 35 (quoting then HCFA Deputy Administrator’s speech 
in the 1980s which called for contracting reform). 
 67. LEAVITT, supra note 24, at III-3. 
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Leavitt has stated, “a premier health plan that allows for comprehensive, 
quality care and world-class beneficiary and provider service”?68 
Analyzing the legislative design and its implementation reveals that while 
many of the efficiency goals may succeed, barriers exist to the realization of 
Secretary Leavitt’s assertion.  These barriers include the limited scope of the 
legislation and the manner in which it is being implemented.  Both reflect 
the influence of the ideology held by the Republicans in Congress and the 
administration when the MMA was enacted. 
The legislative provisions already emphasize efficiency in claims 
processing,69 and many of the changes the Secretary envisioned are 
important to achieving efficiency.  Who can argue with upgraded 
information systems, less fragmentation, and improved service incentives?  
However, the Medicare FFS infrastructure must go beyond efficiency in order 
to meet the needs of the twenty-first century Medicare program.  Improving 
FFS Medicare demands more than speedy claims processing; it requires a 
comprehensive redesign of the role of Medicare contractors.  New tools are 
also needed if Medicare is to ensure quality of care for beneficiaries.  In 
order to evaluate provider performance and outcomes, contractors need an 
infrastructure to acquire and analyze data that goes beyond the current 
claim forms.70  They also need tools to encourage and enforce appropriate 
utilization of services and performance.71  Contractors need to be rewarded 
for raising quality and not just for achieving efficiency in claims processing.72  
It is quite challenging to conceptualize how to create quality management 
within an essentially unmanaged FFS program.  However, creative efforts to 
design those tools, through either redesign of the contractor roles or other 
mechanisms, must be undertaken.73 
There are also barriers to a robust FFS future embedded in the 
implementation of the MAC regions.  Prior to the MMA, the carrier and FI 
regions were drifting into incoherence.74  The original sixty-four carrier 
 
 68. Id. at i. 
 69. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56 (discussing legislative methods for 
increasing efficiency). 
 70. See LEAVITT, supra note 24, at III-7 (discussing the key role data centers play in claims 
processing and the need for a modernization of data center operations); see also Foote & 
Halaas, supra note 29, at 867 (discussing the need to invest in FFS infrastructure). 
 71. See Foote & Halaas, supra note 29, at 866-67 (discussing possible quality 
improvement measures that Medicare contractors could adopt). 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. at 865-867 (discussing the current role of local contractors and offering 
recommendations on contractor reform). 
 74. See Joint Hearing, supra note 35 (describing the existing contractor environment and 
resulting patchwork of networks); Foote, supra note 15, at 141 (discussing formation of multi-
state and multi-contract networks).  
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regions reflected the underlying insurance infrastructure at the time.75  The 
conventional wisdom likely was that the regions were designed in part to 
reflect the tremendous variation in the use and quality of Medicare services 
across the country.76  However, the creation of multi-contract networks was 
a response to contracting opportunities rather than continuing development 
of coherent regions.77  The variation in the size and resources of contractors 
also created corresponding differences in their efforts.78  The fifteen new 
regions are similarly incoherent.  CMS drew them to equalize region size 
based on number of beneficiaries and providers79 rather than practice 
patterns or referral patterns that would provide a basis for measuring quality 
improvement. 
Multiple regional designs in the MMA based on different principles 
exacerbated these problems.  The MACs are designed for efficiency.80  
However, a completely different set of values underlies the new Medicare 
Advantage Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) regions and the 
freestanding prescription drug plans (PDPs) regions.81  Therefore, the 
program cannot coherently incentivize regional improvements in quality 
because the regional designs of the two delivery models are not coherent.  It 
is challenging to run a national program that has parallel delivery structures 
and the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) recognized that 
two competing delivery models might encourage better performance from 
each as they compete for beneficiaries.82  However, making rational 
 
 75. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 22; MYERS, supra note 12, at 181 
(discussing the formation of the original sixty-four carrier regions and how thirty-three Blue 
Shield Plans covered the majority of regions). 
 76. For a discussion of geographic variation in Medicare spending, see John E. 
Wennberg et al., Geography and the Debate Over Medicare Reform, 2002 HEALTH AFF. (WEB 
EXCL.) W96, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.96v1.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2007). 
 77. See Foote, supra note 15, at 140 (discussing motivations for reducing the number of 
contractors). 
 78. See id. at 143 (discussing variations in contractor policies). 
 79. See LEAVITT, supra note 24, at III-3 (discussing the rationale behind formation of the 
fifteen regions). 
 80. See id. at I-3 (discussing how the reforms grew out of a realization that Medicare 
needed to be more efficient and effective to adequately service beneficiaries and healthcare 
providers). 
 81. See Susan Bartlett Foote & Peter J. Neumann, The Impact of Medicare Modernization 
on Coverage Policy: 0Recommendations for Reform, 11 AM. J. OF MANAGED CARE 140, 140 
(2005) (discussing formation of Medicare Advantage PPOs); Covington & Burling, CMS 
Establishes PDP and MA Regions (Dec. 2004), available at www.cov.com/ 
listall.aspx?showpubitems=true&archiveyear=2004 (follow article’s title hyperlink) (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2008) (explaining the key considerations used by CMS in establishing PDP regions). 
 82. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 4. 
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comparisons is difficult, if not impossible, as the two models operate in 
different silos within the program. 
The ideology underlying the MMA plays a role in these challenges.  The 
Republican authors of the legislation clearly favored the Medicare 
Advantage health plans over the FFS part of the program,83 reflecting their 
support for “privatizing” Medicare by moving the program from FFS 
administered pricing to premium support for health plan choices.84  The 
MMA delivers greater financial resources in support of Medicare Advantage, 
including paying the plans premiums that exceed the FFS payments to 
doctors and hospitals.85 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The contractor reform provisions in the MMA were long sought in order 
to create greater flexibility and efficiency in the administration of the FFS 
side of Medicare.  While they do provide opportunities for necessary 
improvements, they fall far short of truly “modernizing” the popular and 
important FFS infrastructure.  Advocates of FFS must seek reforms that will 
provide the necessary tools and infrastructure to promote improvements in 
quality and must ensure that FFS receives fiscal parity with the Medicare 
Advantage side of the program. 
 
 83. See Robert A. Berenson, Medicare Disadvantaged and the Search for the Elusive 
‘Level Playing Field,’ 2004 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) W4-572, W4-577, available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.572v1.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2007). 
 84. See id. at W4-576-77. 
 85. See id. at W4-577. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
78 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:67 
 
